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JUSTICE HARLAN AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DICHOTOMY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS*
ROGER J. MINER**

In the jurisprudence of Justice Harlan, a citizen of the United States
generally may rely on an expansive reading of the enumerated rights set
out in the Bill of Rights for protection from the depredations of the federal
government. The citizen of a state, however, generally may rely only on
a rather subjective reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a restraint on arbitrary state action. The jurisprudence of
Justice Harlan does not accommodate the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment for application to the states.1 What
is not permitted to the national government, therefore, may be allowed to
a state government. Acts of the national government may violate the rights
or liberties of citizens of the United States, while the same acts, performed
by a state government, may violate no rights or liberties of the citizens of
the state. The dichotomy is contradictory, confusing, and, ultimately,
irreconcilable.
When the Supreme Court upheld a conviction under a federal
obscenity statute prohibiting the mailing of obscene materials, using an
approved definition of obscenity, Harlan dissented. 2 In his opinion, the
federal statute could not be constitutionally construed to reach more than
hard-core pornography.' His dissent encompassed the notions that the
interests protected by the obscenity statutes are primarily those of the
states, that the federal interest in this area is attenuated, and that the
dangers of federal censorship are greater than the dangers of state action
of the same type.4 Concurring in a decision upholding a state obscenity
statute, however, Harlan considered the relevant inquiry to be whether the
state so subverted the fundamental liberties implicit in the Due Process
* Presented at the New York Law School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice
John Marshall Harlan (Apr. 20, 1991).
** Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Adjunct Professor
of Law, New York Law School.
1. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(rejecting the doctrine of incorporation).
2. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
3. See id. at 507.
4. See id. at 504-06.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as to require invalidation of the state
action.5
When the Supreme Court held that a city's prohibition on the
exhibition of a motion picture deemed not suitable for young viewers was
unwarranted under the provisions of a statute providing for the
classification of motion pictures, Justice Harlan dissented. 6 He wrote:
[N]o improvement in this chaotic state of affairs is likely to come
until it is recognized that this whole problem is primarily one of
state concern, and that the Constitution tolerates much wider
authority and discretion in the States to control the dissemination
of obscene materials than it does in the Federal Government. 1
When it came to applying the brakes to the states, it seems that Justice
Harlan would have us rely on his vision of good and evil. In the
celebrated California case involving the conviction of a man who wore in
a courthouse a jacket emblazoned with the initial letters of each word in
the phrase "for unlawful carnal knowledge" juxtaposed with the words
"the draft," Harlan gave us his vision of the limits on state regulation of
speech.' He concluded that the state could not bar the obscenity under the
provisions of a statute prohibiting disturbance of the peace by affirmative
conduct.9 Finding plainly untenable the state's argument that it could
regulate the speech in question because it spawned the inherent likelihood
of violence, Harlan explained that the existence of.those "with such
lawless and violent proclivities" is not a sufficient basis for allowing the
state to bar people from "ventilat[ing] their dissident views. " " He
simply thought that the word in question could not be distinguished from
any other offensive word, expressing himself in the oft-quoted phrase,
"one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."" Robert Bork has objected to
the moral relativism of the phrase, pointing out that "one man's larceny
is another's just distribution of goods." 2 The comparison may not be
an apt one, but it does point out the lack of a standard.
5. See id.at 501. The state case, Alberts v. California, was decided in the same
opinion as Roth.
6. See Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
7. Id. at 107-08.
8. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
9. See id. at 19-20.
10. Id. at 23.
11. Id.at25.
12. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 249 (1990).
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Justice Harlan has been described as an aristocrat, one "of noble
lineage," as well as "a patrician of the spirit."13 I am not sure what is
meant by those terms. I do know that much of Harlan's civil rights
jurisprudence evinces a paternalistic approach to the problems of society.
When the Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute first came before the
Supreme Court and was dismissed for lack of a live controversy, Harlan
dissented.14 He confronted the merits of the claim and held the statute
unconstitutional on due process grounds. In his opinion, the state statute
violated substantive due process, which he characterized as "a rational
continuum which, broadly spealdng, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints and which also
recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to
justify their abridgment." 5 When the Court finally confronted the merits
of the state statute and held that criminalizing the use of contraceptives
was unconstitutional on the basis of "zones of privacy," "emanations,"
and "penumbras,"" Harlan issued a separate concurring opinion. 17
Again looking directly to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Harlan found that the Connecticut statute "violate[d] basic
These are
values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"18
wonderful words, but difficult to characterize as law.
Harlan nevertheless supported the power of the states to deprive their
citizens of a number of rights we now take for granted. He thought that
there was a rational basis for a state poll tax as a voting qualification,
observing that "the Equal Protection Clause... [does not] rigidly impose
He
upon America an ideology of unrestrained egalitarianism.""
considered state legislative apportionments wholly free of constitutional
limitations, except for the guaranty to each state of a republican form of
government, a guaranty generally not applicable to apportionment.' He
thought that the Miranda decision "represent[ed] poor constitutional law
13. Nathan Lewin, Justice Harlan: The Full Measure of the Man, 58 A.B.A. J. 579,
583 (1972), reprintedin THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 125, 135 (Jesse Choper
ed., 1987).
14. See Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
16. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
17. See id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 500 (Harlan, ., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)).
19. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
20. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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and entail[ed] harmful consequences for the country at large." 21 He
thought wrong the Court's holding that the Fourteenth Amendment makes
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the
states under federal standards, finding that the holding "carries extremely
mischievous, if not dangerous, consequences for our federal system in the
realm of criminal law enforcement." ' He further found the Court's
incorporation doctrine antithetical to the "purpose of our federal system"
through a "compelled uniformity."'
When the Supreme Court, applying federal standards, granted the
habeas petition of a person who had been convicted of contempt after
invoking his self-incrimination privilege in a state gambling investigation,
Harlan protested what he perceived as the Court's premise "that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a shorthand directive to
this Court to pick and choose among the provisions of the first eight
Amendments and apply those chosen, freighted with their entire
accompanying body of federal doctrine, to law enforcement in the
States."' In his view, the criminal justice systems of the states should
be checked only by an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause that is informed by the "development of the community's
sense of justice [which] may in time lead to expansion of the protection
which due process affords."' That is just about as standardless as you
can get!
Carrying out the same theme, Harlan, in a double jeopardy case,
attacked the selective incorporation doctrine as unsupported "in history or
reason" and decried the "eroding . . . of the basics of our federal

system."' In a case dealing with a New York rule allowing the jury to
determine both the truthfulness and voluntariness of a confession, he wrote
that "'the states are free to allocate functions as between judge and jury
as they see fit,"' and "[iimitations on the States' exercise of their
responsibility to prevent criminal conduct should be imposed only where
it is demonstrable that their own adjustment of the competing interests
infringes rights fundamental to decent society."' In a case involving a
state's harmless error rule, his question was whether the rule was a
reasonable one and whether it was "applied arbitrarily to evade the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
Stein v.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 808-09 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 439 (1964) (Harlan, J.,dissenting) (quoting
New York, 346 U.S. 156, 179 (1953)).
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underlying constitutional mandate of fundamental fairness."' His dissent
in that case was predicated on the belief that the majority had
unnecessarily interfered with a state rule and *that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not "purportl to give federal courts supervisory powers
... over state courts. " 29
Harlan's expansive view of the Bill of Rights as applied to the federal
government is manifested in a number of his decisions. He criticized the
lack of a warrant in a case involving the search of an illegal .distillery. °
He required that an informant's information be shown to be reliable as a
basis for a finding of probable cause in the issuance of a search
warrant." In another case, dissenting from the majority's view, he said
that removing an automobile from the scene of an arrest and holding it for
a search at the convenience of the police oversteps the applicable
exception for warrantless searches of automobiles.3 2 He favored giving
appellants the retroactive benefit of favorable new rules on direct
appeal. 3 These cases stand in sharp contrast to Harlan's view of the Bill
of Rights as applied (or really as not applied) to the states.' The problem
of the Harlan dichotomy, as I see it, lies in its failure to account for
another Fourteenth Amendment provision that is just as important as the
due process requirement: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
35
States."
Justice Harlan was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1955, the year
that I was elected Managing Editor of the New York Law School Law
Review, then known as the New York Law Forum. Our March 1955 issue
was dedicated to Justice Harlan. 6 We reviewed his educational
background, his career at the bar, his public service, his World War II
service, and some of the decisions he wrote during his year as a Second
28. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 51 (1967) (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
29. Id. at 47.
30. See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1958).
31. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1969).
32. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 62-63 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 680-81 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
34. See generally William H. Ledbetter, Jr., Mr. Justice Harlan: Due Process and
Civil Liberties, 20 S.C. L. REV. -389 (1968) (examining Harlan's due process
jurisprudence); Lewis I. Maddoeks, The Two Justices Harlanon Civil Rights and Liberties:
A Study in Judicial Contrasts, 68 KY. L.J. 301 (1979-80) (contrasting Harlan's views with
those of his more activist grandfather in regard to constitutional restriction on state action).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. See John Marshall Harlan, 1 N.Y. L.F. 1 (1955).
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Circuit judge. We noted President Eisenhower's statement that Harlan's
qualifications for the Supreme Court were the highest that he could
find,37 although we knew that Thomas E. Dewey and Herbert Brownell
had passed on their favor with the President to a man who was their
friend, colleague, and partner.38 We observed in the conclusion of the
dedication that Harlan's "lifetime of active practice is one asset in which
the present Court is not particularly strong, since many of the Justices
came to the Court from political or academic life."3 9 In retrospect, I
cannot help but wonder if it was that background-United States Attorney,
downtown New York City law firm, cloistered youth, Princeton and
Oxford-that contributed to the dichotomy of his jurisprudence. Perhaps
we should not have been so critical of academics and politicians.

37. See id. at 10.
38. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTCES AND PRESIDENTS 259 (1985).
39. John Marshall Harlan, supra note 36, at 10.

